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ABSTRACT 
 
The influence of overconfident CEOs on their firms, and more particularly the level of 
innovativeness of the firm is gaining more attention in the current complex business 
environment. In addition, the ways in which CEO personality traits influence organisational 
outcomes are of interest to several disciplines, as is reflected in the research available.  
Using several regression models, this thesis examines the moderating impact of three 
firm-specific factors (organisational slack, firm leverage and firm growth) on the relationship 
between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation performance. The study includes data from 
2011-2016 of 85 different firms within the global pharmaceutical industry, resulting in 479 
firm year observations. 
Results show that the initial positive relationship between CEO overconfidence and 
firm innovation performance is not supported (H1). Despite this insignificant outcome, the 
findings suggest a positive moderating effect of organisational slack (H2) on the relationship 
between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation performance. No moderating effect could 
be established for firm leverage (H3) or firm growth (H4) on the relationship between CEO 
overconfidence and firm innovation performance, preventing us from drawing any further 
inferences. 
Based on this research, firms are recommended to set sensible targets for organisational 
slack as this allows for appropriate funding of innovative projects which can have both 
significant direct and indirect effects on the innovation performance of a firm. 
 
 
Keywords: CEO Overconfidence, Firm Innovation Performance, Organisational Slack, Firm 
Leverage, Firm Growth, Upper Echelon Theory  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Every firm, irrespective of its business, is making strategic decisions on a continuous basis. 
These decisions are ultimately made by the Chief Executive Officer, hereafter CEO, as he leads 
the firm. For this reason, many researchers have taken it upon themselves to decipher the 
impact which CEOs have on their respective firms. Ground-breaking research by Hambrick & 
Mason (1984) modelled the Upper Echelon Theory, hereafter UET, which notes that 
organisational outcomes can be partially predicted by the actions of their managers. This theory 
is becoming increasingly relevant as the tasks of CEOs are becoming more complex and thus 
having the right CEO is becoming more critical. Hambrick (2007) has shown that CEO 
characteristics in terms of their experience, values and personalities affect their interpretation 
of situations and, in turn, their decision making. Moreover, Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella 
(2009) mention that the influence that CEOs have within their firm enables them to have a 
direct impact on the organisational outcomes.  
The results of the actions of CEOs are not the sole predictor of the outcome of a firm, 
however they can determine part of the outcome. In order to identify how the decisions of a 
CEO come about, it is important to identify what behavioural traits influence the decision-
making process of a CEO. The literature review on the behavioural traits of CEOs indicate that 
psychological biases such as overconfidence play a very important role (Galasso & Simcoe, 
2010; Hirshleifer, Low & Teoh, 2012; Malmendier & Tate, 2005a). Overconfidence can be 
expressed in many different forms, such as being narcissistic (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011), 
but ultimately boils down to the tendency to overestimate one’s own ability to perform a task 
(Hiller & Hambrick, 2005). Miller and Ross (1975) show that this tendency to overestimate 
one’s own ability stems from a self-serving attribution bias. Individuals associate their 
successes with personal skill whilst failure is perceived to be due to back luck or poor timing. 
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This phenomenon is further reflected upon by Kahneman and Tversky (1974) as they 
found that humans systematically make choices that defy clear logic due to their “cognitive 
biases”. Moreover, Kahneman (2011) sees overconfidence as the most significant human bias. 
Overconfidence is examined extensively in the field of social psychology (Svenson, 1981). 
Besides rating oneself higher as shown by Svenson (1981), overconfidence gives CEOs an 
illusion of total control through which they believe that failure can be avoided (Langer, 1975). 
This all results in the presumption that the level of overconfidence of a CEO has an impact on 
the outcome of his/her respective firm (Gervais, Heaton & Odean, 2003).  
One of the firm outcomes which is expected to be affected by CEO overconfidence is 
the level of innovativeness within a firm, supported by extensive literature review. The level 
of innovation performance is becoming more crucial now than ever as trends of globalisation, 
faster product life cycles and global competition make firms more dependent on being 
innovative. The basis of being successful and having a competitive advantage lies in being able 
to be one step ahead of competition (Cardinal, 2001). Therefore, to stay competitive, CEOs 
need to prompt their firms to be innovative (Galasso and Simcoe, 2011). Furthermore, the 
strength of the relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation performance 
will depend on several factors, both on an internal firm-level as well as external environmental 
factors (Barker III & Mueller, 2002). For the actions of a CEO to be effective in terms of 
positively impacting firm innovativeness, it is important that several firm-specific factors are 
being taken into account. These factors can either act as a catalyst or hinder the impact that 
CEO overconfidence has on firm innovation performance. From the literature review, three 
main factors have been identified as important and are taken into account as they each 
encompass different parts of a firm’s composition. 
 Firstly, organisational slack is considered a highly important source for the funding of 
innovation (Herold, Jayaraman & Narayanaswamy, 2006). As organisational slack reflects the 
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resources available, it allows CEOs to manage their additional investments (Herold et al., 
2006). This is expected to allow overconfident CEOs to more effectively impact operations 
and foster innovative practices.  
Secondly, firm leverage is expected to have a significant negative impact on firm 
innovation performance. In addition to the amount of resources available, it is important to 
investigate how current operations are being funded, either through debt (loans) or equity as 
this gives an indication of the opportunity for CEOs to innovate (Savignac, 2008). High levels 
of debt reduce the borrowing capacity of a firm resulting in the possibility of the firm not being 
able to gain sufficient external funds for future innovative activities (Bourgeois III, 1996). 
Likewise, high levels of debt are linked to high levels of financial risk which may result in 
fewer opportunities to innovate (Savignac, 2008).  
 Thirdly, firm growth has a significant positive impact on firm innovation performance. 
Scholars recognize a clear positive relationship between firm growth and innovation (Demirel 
& Mazzucato, 2012). They further establish that slow growth will result in fewer resources 
being available. This lower amount of resources will decrease the ability of a firm to be 
innovative and therefore the opportunity for overconfident CEOs to steer innovation. From this 
we can see that firm growth can positively impact the relationship between CEO 
overconfidence on firm innovation performance.  
All three firm specific factors are expected to have an impact on the relationship 
between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation performance and therefore will be explored 
further throughout this thesis. The proposed relationships are displayed in Figure 1.  
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The research question of this thesis is therefore two-fold. First, it questions the 
following: “Does CEO overconfidence impact the level of firm innovation performance?”. 
Furthermore, it tries to fill the current gap in literature, by posing the following question: “Do 
differences in firm-specific factors (organisational slack, firm leverage and firm growth) have 
a moderating effect on the relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation 
performance?”. The research is specifically focused on the global pharmaceutical industry as 
firms within this industry focus heavily on innovation in order to survive and therefore the 
impact of the actions of a CEO on firm innovation is expected to be more explicit (Cardinal, 
2001; Li & Tang, 2010).  
 The structure of the thesis is as follows. Firstly, this thesis reviews current literature to 
gain a comprehensive understanding of what has been explored by previous scholars up till 
now. The second section describes the research design as well as methodology, stating what 
statistical analysis needs to be done to answer the hypotheses appropriately. Next, the results 
section which in addition includes a discussion of the results addressing the implications, both 
theoretical and managerial, as well as describing the limitations of the study and potential areas 
for further research. Finally, the last section provides overall conclusions encompassing all 
outcomes. 
CEO Overconfidence Firm Innovation Performance
Organizational Slack H2 ( + )
Firm Leverage H3 ( - ) 
Firm Growth H4 ( + )
H1 ( + )
Figure 1 - The proposed conceptual model 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW & HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
This section provides a review of the current literature with regards to all topics which need to 
be explored as a prerequisite to answer the research gap. First, the Upper Echelon Theory is 
explored after which all prior literature is analysed in order to develop all hypotheses. 
 
2.1 Upper Echelon Theory  
CEOs have a large variety of tasks and responsibilities such as the making of major strategic 
decisions, managing daily operations and the allocation of the firm’s resources. Not all firms 
have allocated their CEOs the same amount of power. Some allow their CEO to make strategic 
decisions on their own whilst other firms have a more refined decision-making process in place 
in which a board of directors is actively involved in the decision-making process.  
In recent years, scholars have paid a great deal of attention to the impact a CEO has on 
his/her respective firm. A ground-breaking organisational study is the Upper Echelon Theory 
conducted by Hambrick and Mason (1984) which states that organisational outcomes may be 
partially predicted by the behavioural traits of managers. The notion that personality traits 
influence firm outcomes sparked a large interest among scholars from both psychological as 
well as managerial disciplines. To examine the impact of CEOs characteristics on firm 
performance, it is relevant to compare CEOs in similar firms but with different performance 
levels. Mackey (2008) shows that a CEO significantly impacts firm performance by examining 
the variance in firm performance in homogeneous (similar) firms, reinforcing Hambrick’s 
observations. 
Hambrick (2007) further explores under what circumstances the level of impact that 
managers have is the highest. Managerial discretion is found to play a large role in this. Within 
the management discipline, managerial discretion refers to the absence of constraints and the 
opportunity for managers to pursue organisational goals (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). 
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When high managerial discretion exists, i.e. no constraints on CEO choices, the impact of their 
actions will be significantly stronger (Hambrick, 2007). Furthermore, low levels of support for 
CEOs in combination with high levels of complexity in the tasks at hand result in unilateral 
CEO decisions, which could have a large impact on the firm outcomes. This is due to the fact 
that when a task is highly complex it is likely that managers will revert back to their old ways 
of work which are shaped by their own behavioural traits (Hambrick, 2007). Moreover, as the 
environment in which managers operate is complex, there is no clear frame of control or 
comparison ability by firms on managers (Alicke, 1985; Moore & Kim, 2003). As no 
comparison can be made, it allows for CEOs to leave their own mark on a firm, once again 
reinforcing the UET (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996).  
 
2.2 CEO Overconfidence & Firm Innovation Performance 
After having established the influence of managers on firm outcomes, it is important to identify 
what behavioural traits have an influence on these managers. When reviewing the many 
behavioural traits, it is clear that overconfidence has gotten a lot of academic attention (Galasso 
& Simcoe, 2010; Hirshleifer et al., 2012; Malmendier & Tate, 2005a). Overconfidence can be 
expressed in many different forms, such as being narcissistic (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011), 
but all ultimately boils down to the tendency to overestimate one’s own ability to perform a 
task (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005). This phenomenon has been widely examined in the field of 
social psychology. Kahneman and Tversky (1974) show that humans systematically make 
choices that defy clear logic due to their cognitive biases, i.e. by perceiving the information 
wrong. This is further examined in the field of behavioural finance where the neoclassical view 
of an individual who makes rational decisions, is replaced by an individual in which 
psychology may influence decision making. Svenson (1981) clearly shows how individuals 
can overestimate their own ability as he conducted a study which resulted in a world in which 
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82% of all driving humans rate them amounts the 30% top drivers, a statement which clearly 
cannot hold. Besides overconfidence having a profound impact on the self-assessment of 
CEOs, it also makes them underestimate the potential of failure. Overconfident CEOs have the 
illusion of control and believe that the outcome of their strategic choices can be steered, and 
failure can be avoided resulting in more risk being taken (Langer, 1975). 
Overconfidence though cannot just be characterized as either a positive or negative 
characteristic of a CEO. On the one hand, overconfident managers will have a higher likelihood 
to be promoted to CEO (Goel & Thakor, 2008) which implies that overconfidence can be 
beneficial for one’s career path. However, Goel & Thakor (2008) on the other hand also show 
in the same article that there is a clear indication that excessively overconfident CEOs are more 
likely to be fired than moderately confident or shy CEOs.  
When looking further into the impact of overconfidence on CEOs it is clear that if there 
is less fear of failure, forecasting is more optimistic (Hribar & Yang, 2016). This over optimism 
leads to CEOs misjudging the potential in the market as well as the returns of a firm’s own 
projects. Firms that have overconfident CEOs tend to follow more aggressive corporate 
policies which translates into relatively higher investment ratios (Ben-David, Graham & 
Harvey, 2013). Furthermore, overconfident CEOs do not improve or adjust their forecasts after 
receiving feedback as they are less prone to corrective feedback due to their self-belief, 
therefore disregarding any feedback (Chen, Crossland & Luo, 2015). All things considered, the 
above-mentioned impact of overconfidence on a CEO shows that having an overconfident CEO 
has both positive as well as negative consequences for a firm’s performance (Chen et al., 2015).  
One aspect of firm performance that is particularly affected by CEO overconfidence is 
the level of firm innovation performance. This is due to the fact that as the level of fear of 
failure for overconfident CEOs is less (Hribar & Yang, 2016). This is combination with their 
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more optimistic forecasting results in overconfident CEOs having a stronger inclination to 
invest in innovation projects (Langer, 1975).  
When considering the impact that CEO overconfidence has on firm innovative 
performance, it can be observed that overconfidence impacts the perception of project success. 
CEOs are more optimistic about the outcome and thus more willing to invest in innovative 
projects. This lower fear of failure is a crucial factor by which a positive relationship between 
CEO overconfidence and firm innovation performance stands (Galasso & Simcoe, 2011). More 
evidence of this positive relationship can be found in the research done by Hirshleifer et al. 
(2012) in which not only a higher amount of patent citations is found with more overconfident 
CEOs but also a higher amount of innovation input and success for given R&D expenditures. 
Barker III and Muller (2002) have further delved into analysing whether this is truly due to the 
characteristics of CEOs by comparing firms within the same industries. When accounting for 
corporate strategy, firm structure and firm size, it is clear that the characteristics of individual 
CEOs change the innovation within a firm (Barker III & Mueller, 2002; Coad, Segarra & 
Teruel, 2016). Following the above reasoning, it could be argued that CEO overconfidence has 
a positive effect on firm innovation performance which forms the basis for hypothesis 1:  
 
Hypothesis 1: CEO overconfidence has a positive effect on firm innovation performance 
 
2.3 Firm Specific Factor – Organisational Slack 
After having established the positive relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm 
innovation performance (Hypothesis 1), it is important to elaborate on several firm specific 
factors that may strengthen or weakens this relationship. First of all, Coad et al. (2016) show 
that several factors such as firm structure and size need to be accounted for as these have a 
proven direct influence on the level of innovation. Besides these factors, it is important for 
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managers of firms to determine how to gain a competitive advantage. In order to do so, a 
resource-based view is taken which allows CEOs to highlight new strategic opportunities 
(Wernerfelt, 1984). This framework helps CEOs to achieve sustainable competitive advantage 
and determine what resources are needed in order to gain an advantage. When defining what 
resources are already available to create a sustainable competitive advantage, it is important to 
look at a firm’s level of organisational slack. According to Pan, Wei & Al-Hakim (2016) 
organisational slack is defined as  
“a reference to the resources available to the firm above the resources necessary to 
achieve immediate business and operational requirements. It is usually assessed in 
terms of financial resources. Organisational slack is considered as the important 
source for funding innovation.” (p. 588) 
 
By looking at organisational slack, managers are able to determine what resources are 
available for funding innovation (Nohria & Gulati, 1997). This allows CEOs to justify their 
strategic choices (Bourgeois III, 1996). Moreover, O’Brien (2003) recognises that when a firm 
does not take its amount of slack into account it results in a poor performing firm, as the firm 
does not realise how many resources can be allocated towards new projects, resulting in either 
investing too much or too little. All arguments mentioned above recognise organisational slack 
as a positive factor, however some scholars disagree. Research by Herold et al. (2006), suggests 
that as more opportunities arise, there is no control over what is being invested in which results 
in wasteful investments and therefore negatively affect the innovativeness of a firm. Likewise, 
high organisational slack could promote inertia within the firm, reducing the urge to be 
innovative (Baker & Nelson, 2005). 
Still, most literature studies see organisational slack as an important factor in enhancing 
the level of innovativeness of a firm (Nohria & Gulati, 1997; O’Brien, 2003). Damanpour 
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(1991) suggests that high levels of organisational slack result in managers being larger risk-
takers and therefore innovate more. Moreover, organisational slack allows firms to continue to 
operate during economic downturns. An economic buffer such as organisational slack allows 
an organisation to reduce risk associated with failing projects and therefore foster new projects 
with fewer true consequences (Bourgeois III, 1996; O’Brien, 2003). 
Overall, high levels of organisational slack allow CEOs to continue to pursue 
innovative opportunities as it provides them with the necessary resources to do so (Arena, 
Michelon & Trojanowski, 2018; Wasserman, Nohria & Anand, 2001). Thus, one could argue 
that organisational slack influences the relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm 
innovation performance positively by allowing CEOs to execute their investments in firm 
innovation and providing the necessary resources to do so, forming the basis for hypothesis 2:  
 
H2: Firm slack strengthens the effect of CEO overconfidence on firm innovation performance. 
 
2.4 Firm Specific Factor – Firm Leverage 
Another factor to take into account is the level of firm leverage. By looking into the degree of 
financial leverage in a firm, it allows for CEOs to see how the company’s assets and business 
operations are financed; either by debt or equity. When there is high firm leverage, it indicates 
that most items are financed by debt as opposed to equity. The leverage ratio allows CEOs to 
make more informed strategic choices as it gives insights into whether a firm is able to pay off 
its direct outstanding loans.  
 Giudici & Paleari (2000) have shown that financial constraints create a barrier to 
innovate and thus negatively impact the relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm 
innovation performance. Firms cannot be truly innovative and compete in their respective 
industry without using traditional financing methods such as taking out funds. Therefore, a 
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high level of firm leverage could indicate that firms have been aggressively financing their 
innovation activities with debt. Hall & Lerner (2009) further investigate this gap between being 
able to fund innovation internally and the need for acquiring external funding within firms. 
They discovered that CEOs prefer internal funds as opposed to financing via external funds or 
venture capital funds thus resulting in a gap between the funding available and the funding 
needed to be innovative. This abstaining of external financing is amplified by overconfident 
CEOs who deem external funding costly (Deshmukh et al., 2013).  
 In addition, higher levels of firm leverage lower a firm’s borrowing capacity resulting 
in firms not being able to gain external funds for future innovation activities (Bourgeois III, 
1996). Therefore, when looking at the impact that the degree of financial leverage has on a 
firm, it is clear that this impact is two-fold. On the one hand, a high firm leverage ratio reveals 
that firms are gathering external funds in order to finance their operations and/or innovation 
activities. This showcases a willingness to be innovative and thus could indicate a positive 
association with firm innovativeness. On the other hand, high amounts of debt can indicate a 
limit in the amount of free resources to spend on any future innovation activities and thus result 
in ultimately lower levels of innovation. The latter argument is deemed more sound as high 
levels of debt are linked to high levels of financial risk, resulting in potentially fewer 
opportunities to innovate (Savignac, 2008). 
Overall, one could argue that high firm leverage values hinder overconfident CEOs in 
pursuing innovative projects as the necessary resources are not obtained in a sustainable long-
term manner, due to the lowering of borrowing capacity (Bourgeois III, 1996). This results in 
a weaker impact of CEOs on the innovative performance of their respective firms and forms 
the basis for hypothesis 3: 
 
H3: Firm leverage weakens the effect of CEO overconfidence on firm innovation performance.  
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2.5 Firm Specific Factor – Firm Growth 
A final firm-specific factor that may influence the relationship between CEO overconfidence 
and firm innovation performance is firm growth. Colombelli, Haned & Le Bac (2014) show 
that innovative firms are growing at a more rapid pace than non-innovative firms which is 
supported by other scholars (e.g. Audretsch, Coad & Segarra, 2014; Demirel & Mazzucato, 
2012). However, scholars are not in agreement whether innovation is the cause or the effect of 
rapid growing firms. In other words, does innovation cater for growth or does growth facilitate 
innovative activities? Demirel & Mazzucato (2012) argue that innovation expressed in R&D 
expenditure facilitates the growth of a firm. This is further supported by the fact that innovation 
is considered to be one of the most crucial factors for “superstar” fast growing firms (Coad & 
Rao, 2008). On the contrary, Adjei & Adjei (2017) reveal that firms can be innovative due to 
their continuous increase in market share. This unclear direction of the causality could be 
explained due to the fact that the relationship can be seen as a self-fulfilling prophecy. In this 
context, the initial direction is not clear but higher levels of innovation lead to a higher amount 
of firm growth after which firm growth facilitates more innovative projects (Audretsch, 1995). 
High levels of firm growth allow for CEOs to continue to invest in new innovative 
projects. Once growth slows down, fewer internal resources will be available and thus the 
impact which an CEO has on firm innovativeness decrease. Moreover, Hall & Lerner (2009) 
recognize that CEOs tend to refrain from gaining funds externally due to the perceived high 
costs of doing so. This will result in no additional funds being available for CEOs to continue 
to be as innovative as they used to be. For these reasons, one could argue that when firm growth 
decreases, the impact of overconfident CEOs on the level of firm innovation performance 
decreases accordingly and vice versa: this forms the basis for hypothesis 4: 
 
H4: Firm growth strengthens the effect of CEO overconfidence on firm innovation performance 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
The following section first deals with the data and its sources. Subsequently the sample which 
serves as a foundation to analyse the hypothesized relationships will be discussed. In addition, 
the method of data collection, variable definitions and statistical analysis will be elaborated on. 
 
3.1 Data & Sources  
When considering the relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation 
performance, it is clear from the above-mentioned literature that data from complex and 
volatile industries is needed in order to truly see the impact that overconfident CEOs have on 
firm innovation (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Moreover, what is additionally needed is an 
industry which is heavily relying on new innovations in order to allow firms to succeed and 
survive long-term (Goel & Thakor, 2008). The pharmaceutical industry is one of the largest 
industries in which these characteristics are present (Li & Tang, 2010). R&D expenditure 
represents a large portion of the overall expenditures of a firm and impacts the financial 
situation of a firm drastically (DiMasi, Hansen, Grabowski & Lasagna, 1991). These 
expenditures are needed in order to survive long-term within the industry. 
 When considering trends of globalisation, faster product life cycle and greater 
competition are apparent. It is clear that these factors have made the firms within the 
pharmaceutical industry even more dependent on innovation to survive. Cardinal (2001) states 
that: “the foundation of competitive advantage in the pharmaceutical industry lies in successful 
innovation. The pharmaceutical industry spends more on research and development as a 
percentage of sales than any other high-tech industry, including electronics, computers and 
aerospace” (p.20). Therefore, the global pharmaceutical industry allows for an appropriate 
insight into the relationships at hand.  
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 In order to obtain the quantitative data, several data collection methods were used. The 
data originated from annual reports, BoardEx data as well as Hofstede country dimensions. 
First of all, annual reports of pharmaceutical firms were used in order to obtain financial 
information for each firm. The annual reports ranging from 2010 until 2016 were used to obtain 
longitudinal data. Besides the financial information, all letters to shareholders, hereafter LTS, 
were extracted from the annual reports.  
In addition, CEO specific information for each firm is obtained via BoardEx, an online 
database which consists of information regarding the profiles of each CEO as well as of top 
management teams (BoardEx, 2018). Finally, in order to obtain country specific dimensions, 
Hofstede dimensions regarding power distance, uncertainty avoidance and individualism were 
collected with respect to the country of origin of the firm. Appendix A contains the full list of 
the Hofstede scores for all countries involved in the data analysis. 
 
3.2 Sample and Procedure  
For this thesis, a data set is generated consisting of 85 multinationals within the pharmaceutical 
industry. Appendix B contains the full list of firms. After accounting for incomplete data, 
outliers and lag within the data, 479 firm-year observations between 2011 and 2016 were found 
for these firms. Furthermore, the data from 2010 was used to generate a proxy for firm growth 
using the firm growth values of the year before. In order to determine whether or not these 
firm-year observations are sufficient for the statistical analysis it is important to look into the 
number of independent variables. Burns & Burns (2008) state that one needs 15 times more 
cases than independent variables (IV). For this thesis, this would imply 15 IV *15 resulting in 
a minimum of 225 cases needed. The 480 cases therefore comfortably exceed this requirement. 
The firms originate from 21 countries, with significant presence in India (11%), Japan (27%) 
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and the United States of America (22%). Furthermore, these 85 firms have had 108 different 
CEOs from 2011-2016 originating from 25 different countries.  
 
3.3 Measures 
CEO Overconfidence. Malmendier & Tate (2005a; 2008) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012) 
measure CEO overconfidence by using both an option-based measure, in which the amount of 
options a CEO exercises are measured, as well as press-based measures in terms of linguistic 
analysis. Both measures are shown to be highly correlated. Moreover, qualitative interviews 
are also used to measure the level of overconfidence of a CEO (Simon & Houghton, 2003). 
For this thesis, linguistic analysis of LTS is used in order to gain insights into the level 
of CEO overconfidence. The rationale for this choice is explained below. This analysis is done 
by a programme called Linguistics Inquire and Word Count, hereafter LIWC, which is created 
by Pennebaker Conglomerates Inc (Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan, & Blackburn, 2015). The 
software uses text analysis to determine the sentiment behind the use of certain words. The 
way people use certain words can provide valuable information about their personality, 
characteristics and traits (Pennebaker et al., 2015). LTS are an appropriate proxy to perform 
content analysis on to determine CEO overconfidence for several reasons. First of all, Craig & 
Amernic (2011) provide research showing how aspects of overconfidence within a CEO can 
be identified through their respective LTS. Likewise, Bournois & Point (2006) see evidence of 
CEO overconfidence in their LTS. Secondly, as the LTS is a part of the annual report of a firm, 
is will have been proofread by executives, and will have been adapted considerably to reflect 
individual views (Duriau, Reger & Pfarrer, 2007). Last but not least, annual reports do not 
suffer from retroactive sensemaking. The meaning of the annual report is clear due to the many 
alterations that were made before the actual publication (Barr, Stimpert & Huff, 1992). From 
the LIWC analysis, the clout score is used in this thesis as this score measures the relative rank 
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and power of an individual as well as a sense of overconfidence (Kacewicz, Pennebaker, Davis, 
Jeon & Graesser, 2013).  
 
Firm Innovation Performance. In order to determine firm innovation performance a 
proxy is taken in terms of the level of R&D expenditure. Measuring innovation can be 
challenging and therefore a clear quantitative measure is needed in order to compare firms to 
one another (Smith, 2005). Galasso & Simcoe (2010) use both the logarithm of R&D 
expenditure as well as total patents and citation count to measure the innovation level of a firm. 
Moreover, Hirshleifer et al. (2012) use a similar transformed R&D expenditure variable in 
order to measure the level of innovation input by a firm. As R&D expenditure data is more 
readily available than patent count, this is used to measure firm innovation performance. The 
logarithm of R&D expenditure is taken into account for any non-normality within the data, 
following previous scholars (Galasso & Simcoe, 2010).	"#$%	&''()*+#('	,-$.($%*'/- =1(2(4&6	789-':#+;$-	$=). 
 
Organisational Slack. When considering organisational slack, it is important to look at 
what is truly being measured. When measuring organisational slack, we are aiming to measure 
the resources which are readily available and thus the current ratio will be used in order to 
measure an organisations short term liquidity (Lee & Wu, 2016). Herold et al. (2006) have 
explored both the current and quick ratio in order to measure organisational slack and found 
similar results indicating a homogeneous result between both measures. The current ratio is 
defined as follows: ?;$$-'+	4*+#( = @ABBCDE	FGGCEG@ABBCDE	HIJKILIEICG. In this formula, current assets are the 
assets of a firm which can be converted back to available funds in a short period of time. This 
consists of cash, securities, receivables, inventory and other short-term assets. On the other 
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hand, current liabilities are deemed to be obligations which need to be fulfilled within 12 
months.  
When organisational slack is used as a moderator on the relationship between CEO 
overconfidence and firm innovation performance, a time-delay is necessary as the current 
available resources cannot immediately impact a firm’s innovation performance, especially not 
in the pharmaceutical sector in which research needs to be conducted in order to increase one’s 
innovation level. A one-year lag is assumed in order to accommodate for the time delay 
phenomenon as this will showcase the true timeframe in which organisational slack will impact 
the relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation performance. 
 
Firm Leverage. When measuring the impact which firm leverage has on the relationship 
between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation performance, it is evident that there are 
multiple types of ratios which could be used in order to assess the level of financial leverage. 
Bourgeois III (1996) as well as Yuan & Motohashi (2008) use the debt to equity ratio in order 
to determine the impact of firm leverage on firm investments as higher debt to equity ratios 
reveal how able a CEO is to pursue his/her innovative ideas. The debt to equity ratio is the 
broadest definition of firm leverage (Bei & Wijewardana, 2012) and is formulated as follows: 6-M+	+(	7N;#+O	$*+#( = PQEJL	LIJKILIEICGRSJBCSQLTCB	UVAIEW. By using the debt to equity ratio as a proxy for 
firm leverage, it is expected that the impact this ratio has on our main relationship between 
CEO overconfidence and firm innovation performance will be established.  
 
Firm Growth. In order to examine the impact which firm growth has on the relationship 
between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation performance, several measurements for firm 
growth can be taken into consideration. Colombelli et al. (2014) use the growth rate of turnover 
and firm size as proxies for the level of growth. On the other hand, Demirel & Mazzucato 
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(2012) measure firm growth by concentrating on the output of a firm measured in the form of 
the logarithm of sales in comparison to the previous year. This thesis follows the latter method 
as using the log-difference is the most widespread measure. Moreover, previous scholars such 
as Coad & Rao (2008) gained significant results using this measure. This allows firm growth 
to be measured as follows: "#$%	2$(X+ℎ = 1(2_[*\-]_$E − 1(2_[*\-]_$E_`.  
 
Control Variables. In order to combat any influence of other variables on the overall 
relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation performance, it is necessary to 
include several control variables. First of all, firm size is proven to impact the amount of R&D 
expenditure and thus firm innovation performance. Tushman & Romanelli (2008) show that 
the larger the number of employees, the less likely it is that a firm will implement any radical 
changes. On the contrary, larger firms generally have more resources, allowing for firms to be 
able to invest these in innovative projects and enhancing the innovation capacity of a firm. 
Both factors will impact the level of innovation and therefore firm size needs to be controlled 
for by taking the logarithm of the number of employees (to account for the skewness of the 
distribution): "#$%	]#a- = 1(2(7%9\(O--]_b(+*\). 
Besides controlling at firm-level, one must consider several variables to control for at 
CEO-level. CEO tenure has a significant effect on the level of firm innovation performance as 
the longer a CEO is in charge, the less likely he or she will be to alter his or her current strategy 
(Hambrick, 2007). This is accounted for by controlling for the number of years that the CEO 
is in charge at the firm. Likewise, the older a CEO is, the less he or she tends to spend on R&D 
as they are nearing their retirement age and thus do not have as much of a long-term vision as 
younger CEOs do (Barker III & Mueller, 2002). This will be measured by subtracting the year 
of birth from the year of the annual report.  
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 When considering external influences, it becomes apparent that macro-shocks may 
have a significant impact on all firms within the sample. When considering the great economic 
downturn of 2010, it is evident that events like this have a large influence on specific years and 
therefore all years are dummy coded in order to control for this. Next to global economic 
downturns several more regional economic downturns have occurred due to specific country 
dynamics and characteristics. In order to control for these country fixed effects, Hofstede’s 
country comparison dimensions are added to the model (Hofstede, 2011). Power distance, 
uncertainty avoidance and individualism are selected of Geert Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 
as they give a clear overview of the dynamics at play within each country (Hofstede, 1983). 
An overview of all variables used, and their specifics can be found in Appendix C.  
 
3.4 Analytical analysis  
All data is initially collected in a formulated excel sheet in order to directly calculate all 
variables. These results were transferred to IBM SPSS in order to conduct the statistical 
analysis. In order to gain a better understanding of the various dimensions and variables an 
initial analysis will be conducted in the form of descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations. 
These results will allow for a clearer picture of the relationships at hand.  
 When analysing hypothesis 1, an ordinary least square regression (OLS) is performed, 
both without firm innovation performance as well as added to the various control variables in 
order to deem their significance. After this, the statistical tool ‘PROCESS macro’ by Hayes 
(2013) is performed on the data for hypotheses 2, 3 and 4. Model 1 within PROCESS macro 
tests the moderation effect of the various firm-specific factors on the relationship between CEO 
overconfidence and firm innovation performance (Hayes, 2013). Before these analyses are 
conducted, various assumptions of linearity, normality, homoscedasticity and independence of 
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observations are tested. Moreover, any outliers need to be identified in order to make sure these 
do not generate any skewed results. See Appendix D for the regression model equations.  
4. RESULTS 
 
This chapter provides an analysis of the results of the data and is presented twofold. First, the 
descriptive and bivariate correlations are explored. The second section focusses on the various 
results which can be derived from the statistical analysis in order to review whether the various 
hypotheses are supported.  
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics & Bivariate Correlations 
Before conducting any regressions, it is important to look into both the descriptive as well as 
bivariate correlations of all above-mentioned variables in order to gain a better understanding 
of the relationships at play. These are displayed in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1 - Descriptive statistics & bivariate correlations 
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When comparing the CEO overconfidence level shown by the clout score (M = 84.48, 
SD = 8.94) to the baseline clout scores of LIWC (M = 57.95, SD = 17.51), it is clear that these 
are significantly higher than those obtained earlier from the analysis of text written by 80,000 
authors – see Appendix E for analysis (Pennebaker et al., 2015). This is what is to be predicted 
as texts written by CEOs are expected to be filled with more confidence due to the role and 
characteristics CEOs have. 
The various country control dimensions show a large standard deviation (SD = 15.75, 
23.98, 21.16 respectively), indicating high differences between the various countries from 
which the data originates. When analysing the various CEO control variables, it is clear that 
the average CEO age (M = 57.46, SD = 7.27) and their tenure (M = 8.97, SD = 8.62) is in line 
with the average across the whole of the life sciences industry which lies at 59 years old, 
averaging 9.4 years in the position of CEO (“Age and tenure”, 2017). In addition, the tenure of 
a CEO has a large standard deviation (> 8 years) in comparison to its mean (< 9 years). Firm 
size, which has been transformed for normality by taking the natural logarithm of all employees 
(thousands) gives us an M = 3.75 & SD = 0.77. 
In addition to analysing the descriptive statistics, a bivariate correlation analysis is run 
between all variables. CEO overconfidence has a highly significant small positive relationship 
with the level of firm innovation performance (r = .163, p < .01) as well as between CEO 
overconfidence and firm leverage (r = .161, p < .01). Moreover, a significant negative 
relationship between CEO overconfidence and organisational slack (r = -.251, p < .01) exists. 
Firm innovation performance has a highly significant small negative relationship with 
organisational slack (r = -.152, p < .01). Contrarily, a significant positive relationship exists 
between CEO overconfidence and firm leverage (r = .161, p < .01). Firm growth does not have 
a significant correlation with CEO overconfidence (r = .049, p > .05) whilst a slight significant 
negative relationship exists with firm innovation performance (r = -.090, p < .05). 
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What is more apparent is that when looking into the intercorrelations between the firm 
specific factors, a significant negative relationship between the organisational slack and firm 
leverage exists (r = -.165, p < .01). The question arises whether or not these need to be 
combined, however after reviewing the collinearity statistic of both organisational slack and 
firm leverage this is not needed. Moreover, when considering the origin of each variable in 
terms of formula’s ?;$$-'+	4*+#( = @ABBCDE	FGGCEG@ABBCDE	HIJKILIEICG & 6-M+	+(	7N;#+O	$*+#( =PQEJL	LIJKILIEICGRSJBCSQLTCB	UVAIEW it is clear that a certain amount of the current liabilities can be found back in 
the numerator of the Debt to Equity ratio making the correlational outcome understandable. 
When analysing the control variables, one can see a significant negative relationship 
between CEO age and CEO overconfidence (r = -.094 p < .05) but also a significant positive 
relationship between CEO age and firm innovation performance (r = .106 p < .05). Moreover, 
CEO tenure has a significantly negative relationship with both CEO overconfidence (r = -.161 
p < .01) and firm innovation performance (r = -.242 p < .01). Firm size is significantly positive 
relational to CEO overconfidence (r = .207 p < .01) as well as to firm innovation performance 
(r = .760, p < .01). Lastly, the Hofstede dimensions selected (power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance and individualism) are significantly related to CEO overconfidence (r = -.172 p < 
.01; r = -.186 p < .01; r = .375 p < .01 respectively). Moreover, all are significantly related to 
firm innovation performance (r = -.358 p < .01; r = -.195 p < .01; r = .307 p < .01 respectively).  
 
4.2 Hypotheses analysis  
After having conducted the initial analysis in order to gain a better understanding, it is clear 
that most variables within the model as well as the control variables have a significant 
relationship to one another. In order to run the OLS regressions as well as use ‘PROCESS 
macro’ by Hayes (2013), several assumptions need to be checked. The data is analysed in terms 
of linearity, normality of distribution, collinearity and homoscedasticity (Field, 2009). By 
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running a regression without CEO overconfidence a priori, it becomes clear that the data is 
normal due to the Q-Q plots as well as homoscedastic through the standardised scatterplots 
Likewise, when considering outliers, it is important to look at Cook’s distance between our 
focal variables in order to deem whether several values are highly influential. Hair, Anderson, 
Tatham and Black (1998) consider Cook’s distance values greater than 1 to be influential, 
however this is not the case (max 0.031, see Appendix F for details). 
 
4.3 Simple Linear Regression Analysis 
By conducting an OLS regression, the various relationships between the variables are 
identified. Table 2 illustrates the results of the analysis of just the control variables as well as 
the analysis including the CEO overconfidence score (H1).  
 
 Model 1 – Controls Model 2 – H1 
 b SE b SE 
Constant -1.390** .260 -.992** .300 
CEO Age .011** .003 .011** .003 
CEO Tenure -.020** .003 -.021** .003 
Firm Size .843** .027 .854** .027 
Power Distance -.014** .002 -.014** .002 
Uncertainty Avoidance .008** .001 .008** .001 
Individualism .005** .001 .006** .002 
CEO Overconfidence   -.007** .002 
Adjusted R2 .767 .770 
F F (11,467) = 143.927** F (12,466) = 134.187** 
Note, **p < .01, *p< .05; Dependent Variable: Firm Innovation Performance 
 
Table 2 - Regression results for OLS control regression & hypothesis 1 
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 When first reviewing model 1, it is clear that this control model has an adjusted R2 of 
0.767 indicating that 76.7% of the variance in innovation performance is explained by these 
dependent variables. Moreover, the model is statistically significant with an F-value of 143.927 
at p < 0.01. All control variables show a significant influence on firm innovation performance. 
Both firm size (b = .843, t(467) = 31.758, p < .01) and CEO age (b = .011, t(467) = 3.302, p < 
.01) positively influence firm innovation performance. On the other hand, CEO tenure (b = -
.020, t(467) = --7.547, p < .01) has a significant negative relationship on the innovative 
performance. When considering country fixed effects, all of Hofstede’s dimensions are 
significant. The level of power distance is significantly negative (b = -.014, t(467) = -7.736, p 
< .01) whilst uncertainty avoidance (b = .008, t(467) = 8.719, p < .01) and individualism (b = 
.005, t(467) = 3.181, p < .01) positively influence firm innovation performance. All year 
dummy variables are insignificant indicating no major overarching changes that have impacted 
the innovation performance of a firm. Lastly, the maximum amount of multicollinearity is a 
VIF = 2.437 for country individualism. This indicates no issues in terms of data being collinear 
(Hayes, 2013). 
 Model 2 includes CEO overconfidence in order to test for hypothesis 1. The level of 
adjusted R2 has increased slightly to 0.770 indicating that now 77% of the variance in 
innovation performance is explained by these dependent variables. Moreover, the model is 
statistically significant with an F-value of 134.187 at p < 0.01. The same control variables are 
significant, only slightly deviating from model 1 in terms of Beta’s (β). Likewise, 
multicollinearity is not an issue as the maximum amount is a VIF = 2.705, once again for the 
level of country individualism. Importantly, a significant negative relationship exists between 
the level of CEO overconfidence and firm innovation performance (b = -.007, t(466) = -2.633, 
p < .01). This is contrary to the positive relationship that is expected and thus we can conclude 
that H1 is not supported.  
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4.4 Simple Moderation Analysis 
 
Simple moderation analysis is used in order to study the moderating effect of the organisational 
slack, firm leverage and firm growth on the above tested relationship between CEO 
overconfidence and firm innovation performance. Three separate moderation analyses are 
performed in order to conduct their analysis accordingly (Hayes, 2013). All three models are 
shown below in figures 2 – 4 after which their results are summarized in table 3: 
 
 Model 3 – H2 Model 4 – H3 Model 5 – H4 
 b SE b SE b SE 
Constant -.903** .327 -1.022** .325 -.966** .303 
CEO Overconfidence -.010** .003 -.006* .003 -.007* .003 
Org. Slack (OS) -.072* .034     
Firm Leverage (FL)   .027 .191   
Firm Growth (FG)     -.824 1.105 
Int. CEO OC_OS .001* .001     
Int. CEO OC_FL   -.001 .002   
Int. CEO OC_FG     .009 .013 
Controls       
CEO Age  .011** .003 .018** .003 .011** .003 
CEO Tenure -.022** .003 -.021** .003 -.021** .003 
Firm Size .883** .030 .863** .027 .856** .027 
Power Distance -.013** .002 -.014** .002 -.014** .002 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance .008** .001 .008** .001 .008** .001 
Individualism .006** .002 .006** .002 .006** .002 
Adjusted R2 0.778 0.777 0.776 
F F (14,465) = 116.377** F (14,464) = 115.131** F (14,464) = 114.771** 
Note, **p < .05, *p < .1; Dependent Variable: Firm Innovation Performance 
 Table 3 - Regression results for firm factors 
CEO Overconfidence
Firm Innovation 
Performance
Firm Growth
CEO Overconfidence
Firm Innovation 
Performance
Organizational Slack
CEO Overconfidence
Firm Innovation 
Performance
Firm Leverage
Figure 2 - Moderation analysis 
organisational slack 
Figure 3 - Moderation analysis firm 
leverage 
Figure 4 - Moderation analysis firm 
growth 
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When considering the moderation effect, it is important to look into the interaction 
effect between the independent variable and moderating variable in order to determine whether 
it strengthens or weakens the relationship between the independent and dependent variable 
(Field, 2009; Hayes, 2013). 
When looking into model 3 the results show that CEO overconfidence continues to 
have a significant negative effect on firm innovation performance (b = -.010, t(464) = -3.235, 
p < .01) and that organisational slack has a significant negative effect on firm innovation 
performance (b = -.072, t(464) = -2.092, p < .05). The interaction term of organisational slack 
has a slightly significant positive effect on the relationship between CEO overconfidence and 
firm innovation performance (b = .001, t(464) = 2.237, p < .01). This is in line with the 
observations from the literature review and therefore supports H2.  
When reviewing model 4, it shows that the interaction term of firm leverage does not 
have a significant effect on relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation (b 
= -.001, t(464) = -.253, p = .801). Moreover, the direct effect of firm leverage on firm 
innovation performance is not significant (b = .027, t(464) = .139, p = .889) hindering us to 
draw any inferences. Therefore, H3 is not supported as no significant effects can be found. 
 Finally, model 5 shows that the interaction term for firm growth on the relationship 
between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation performance is insignificant (b = .009, 
t(464) = .686, p = .493). Likewise, the direct relationship between firm growth and firm 
innovation performance is insignificant (b = -.824, t(464) = -.746, p = 0.456). This is not in 
line with hypothesis 4 which predicts a positive relationship, therefore H4 is not supported. In 
summary, the performed statistical analysis provides evidence that there is a significant impact 
of CEO overconfidence on firm innovation performance, however this is in the opposite 
direction of what was expected. Furthermore, the moderating effect of organisational slack is 
proven to be significant. On the other hand, the results indicate no significant relationship of 
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the moderating effect of firm leverage or firm growth. The above-mentioned results are 
concluded in table 4 according to their hypotheses: 
Hypotheses Result 
Hypothesis 1 Not supported 
Hypothesis 2 Supported 
Hypothesis 3 Not supported 
Hypothesis 4 Not supported 
 
Table 4 - Summary of hypotheses 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 General Discussion and Findings 
In the dynamic and ever-changing economy in which the right and most effective management 
has become more and more important, the study of CEO influence has become a topic of 
interest among many scholars (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick & Mason,1984; 
Hambrick, 2007; Mackey, 2008). Ample research has been done on the impact of CEO 
overconfidence on firm innovation performance (Galasso & Simcoe, 2010; Hirshleifer et al., 
2012; Malmendier & Tate, 2005a), however the impact of firm-specific factors on this 
relationship is limited. This thesis builds upon existing literature by providing new insights that 
are focused on the pharmaceutical industry.  
This thesis suggest that CEO overconfidence has a significant negative influence on 
firm innovation performance. This is not in line with results from previous studies in literature 
by scholars who found a positive influence (Galasso & Simcoe, 2010; Simon & Houghton, 
2003; Tang et al., 2015; Wong et al., 2017). Most importantly, the findings of this thesis suggest 
that organisational slack has a significant positive impact on the relationship between CEO 
overconfidence and firm innovation performance. This is in line with the arguments of Arena 
et al. (2018). However, the moderating impact of both firm leverage and firm growth on the 
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relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation performance could not be 
established as significant in this thesis. Both these results are not in line with existing literature 
by scholars on the influence of firm leverage (Bourgeois III, 1996) and firm growth (Demirel 
& Mazzucato, 2012). This may be related to factors specific to the pharmaceutical industry and 
needs to be further investigated. The initial significant negative relationship between CEO 
overconfidence and firm innovation performance is remarkable as similar empirical studies 
often resulted in significantly positive relations (Galasso & Simcoe, 2010; Hirshleifer et al., 
2012; Malmendier & Tate, 2005a). One of the reasons for this result might be related to the 
linguistic analysis method of the letters to shareholders used and will be discussed in detail in 
the “limitations-section”.  
The findings further suggest a significantly positively influence of organisational slack 
on the relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation performance. 
(Hypothesis 2). When delving deeper into the exact interaction effect of the impact of 
organisational slack on the relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation 
performance, it is important to review the interaction effect as depicted in figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5 - Interaction effect organisational slack 
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This indicates a stronger negative relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm 
innovation performance when the level of organisational slack is low compared to high. A 
possible explanation for this result is the limited amount of resources available in a low current 
ratio scenario resulting in lower firm innovation performance for all levels of CEO 
overconfidence. Furthermore, it is observed in the low current ratio scenario that the highly 
overconfident CEO has a stronger impact on firm innovation performance. This can be further 
seen numerically by looking into Hayes’ output in Appendix G that shows analysis only to be 
significant for lower levels of the current ratio.  
It is important to realize that, when looking into the direct influence of organisational 
slack on firm innovation performance, we observe a direct negative impact within the 
regression. This is not in line with the arguments of Herold et al. (2006) who see organisational 
slack as one of the primary sources of the funding of innovation. This discrepancy may be 
explained by Nohria & Gulati (1997) who argue a more complex relationship in which an 
inverse U-shape relation exists that suggests a certain optimal amount of organisational slack. 
Too little organisational slack inhibits expenditure on innovation projects, too much 
organisational slack may cause inefficient innovation projects to be started up that negatively 
impact form innovation performance. 
 The second firm specific factor dealt with firm leverage. The findings did not show any 
clear influence of the debt to equity ratio on the relationship between CEO overconfidence and 
firm innovation performance (Hypothesis 3). The direction of the findings is in line with 
previous literature, however the findings are not significant. Moreover, the direction of the 
direct influence of firm leverage on firm innovation performance, albeit not significant, is in 
line with Hall & Lerner (2009) indicating that higher levels of firm leverage result indicate 
more firm innovation performance as firms are more aggressively financing their innovation 
activities. This is further supported by the high initial significant bivariate correlation. A reason 
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for the non-significance of the findings could lie in the fact that high levels of firm leverage 
can hinder the accessibility of future funds to innovate (Bourgeois III, 1996). This means that 
even though overconfident CEOs may want to be more innovative by acquiring many financial 
resources, the acquiring of these funds may be out of their control (due to restrictive and/or 
prohibitive regulations) thus resulting in no clear effect of firm leverage on the relationship 
between the overconfident CEO and firm innovation performance.  
Furthermore, the relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation 
performance is not significantly influenced by firm growth (Hypothesis 4). This result could 
possibly be explained by the fact that firm growth may not immediately allow CEOs to invest 
more resources into innovative projects. Therefore, the direct impact of firm growth on 
innovative performance may not be as strong as one might initially expect. In particular, as the 
pharmaceutical industry is volatile and highly competitive, the impact of firm growth may only 
be seen on the relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation performance 
after a number of years of sustained firm growth. Only then do we see firms that are more 
likely to commit the necessary resources to fund multi-year innovation projects.  
Finally, it is important to distinguish the impact which our different control variables 
had throughout the statistical analysis. Throughout all regressions, CEO age, CEO tenure, firm 
size and the three country fixed effects by the Hofstede dimensions were significant whilst the 
dummy year variables remained insignificant. The impact of firm size is backed by Tushman 
& Romanelli (2008) who show support for the positive impact as seen in our findings. 
Moreover, the negative impact of CEO tenure is reinforced by Barker III & Mueller (2002) and 
Bartoloni (2013) showing consistent results in the fact that CEOs longer in charge tend to be 
less innovative. The impact of CEO age on firm innovative performance is significantly 
positive, which is somewhat surprising in view of the results of previous studies (Barker III & 
Mueller, 2002). A reason for these findings may be specific to the industry as CEOs within 
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pharmaceutical firms typically first need to “earn their stripes” after which they are able to able 
to steer the firm. This could explain that the older a CEO is the more influence he would have 
within a firm and thus have more say in the level of innovativeness, however no references in 
literature could be identified to back this reasoning.  
 
5.2 Theoretical contribution 
After conducting literature and empirical research, this thesis adds to the current research on 
CEO overconfidence and its influence on firm innovation performance by adding several 
theoretical contributions.  
 Previous research addressed mainly the initial relationship between CEO 
overconfidence and firm innovation performance. This thesis studied the impact of three firm 
specific variables to gain a deeper understanding of their influence.  
This thesis found statistically significant negative relationship between CEO 
overconfidence and firm innovation performance, in contrast with previous scholars (Galasso 
& Simcoe, 2010; Simon & Houghton, 2003; Tang et al., 2015; Wong et al., 2017). In addition, 
this thesis found evidence for a significant positive influence of organisational slack on the 
initial relationship, extending research by Arena et al (2018). 
Furthermore, this thesis demonstrates that the impact of CEO tenure on firm innovation 
performance is in line with previous literature and now also applicable to the pharmaceutical 
industry (Barker III & Mueller, 2002; Bartoloni, 2013). Likewise, the findings of Tushman & 
Romanelli (2008) concerning the impact of firm size on firm innovative performance are 
replicated in this thesis for firms within the pharmaceutical industry. Furthermore, theoretical 
research by Hofstede (2011) concerning the impact of cultural dimensions on firm innovation 
performance have now been extended to the pharmaceutical industry in this thesis. 
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Finally, this thesis has explored an alternative measurement tool in order to define CEO 
overconfidence (in addition to the traditional option and press-based measures). This linguistic 
analysis extends the current use of text analysis on press-based measures and uses the annual 
letters to shareholders instead. This approach has the potential for a more simplified proxy for 
CEO overconfidence, as annual reports are a more accessible source of information and creates 
the possibility for researchers to accurately predict CEO overconfidence.  
 
5.3 Managerial contribution 
Besides having theoretical implications, the thesis identifies some practical and 
pragmatic findings related both to the overconfident CEO as well as the firm itself. These 
findings suggest that the results of this thesis could be beneficial in assisting the assessment, 
search and selection process for CEOs. Furthermore, the thesis results highlight the importance 
of organisational slack and provides the rationale for proper organisational slack target setting. 
Firstly, our findings indicate that as CEO tenure decreases, firm innovation 
performance increases. CEO tenure should be reviewed annually as a CEO tenure that is too 
long could indicate that a firm should call for fresh air within the organisation. Obviously, this 
is not the only factor to be considered in deciding whether a CEO should continue in the 
position, however it can play a significant role.  
Secondly, when recruiting a new CEO several factors should be taken into 
consideration, amongst which the age of the CEO. According to our findings, having an older 
CEO may be beneficial within the pharmaceutical industry as they may have a more extensive 
track record and have proven themselves within the industry. This could lead to them being 
more willing to be more innovative, as our results suggest. This is a novel insight, not identified 
by previous studies and it would be worthwhile exploring this aspect further in future studies. 
Both CEO characteristics (age & tenure) mentioned above can have a significant influence on 
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the CEO’s effectiveness, are likely to impact the CEO’s decisions and hence the associated 
business results.  
Finally, and most importantly, this thesis shows that organisational slack directly 
impacts firm innovation performance negatively as well as strengthens the negative 
relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation performance. This double 
impact needs to be considered when setting firm-specific targets. It makes sense to set sensible 
targets for organisational slack as this allows for appropriate funding of innovative projects. 
As discussed in the “general discussion and findings” section, too little organisational slack 
inhibits expenditure on innovation projects, too much organisational slack may cause 
inefficient innovation projects to be started up that negatively impact form innovation 
performance. It is important to realize that having an overconfident CEO alone does not allow 
for successful firm innovation as an appropriate amount of organisational slack needs to be 
available for these overconfident CEOs to pursue innovative projects (Arena et al., 2018). 
 
5.4 Limitations & Future Research  
Despite the contributions mentioned, this thesis identifies several limitations that need to be 
addressed.  
Firstly, although the sample size is considered sufficiently large, there are some 
limitations in the current data set. When looking into the data, the majority of the year entries 
came from Asian market firms (44%). The rest of the sample is equally distributed across 
Europe and the USA. It is unknown whether this data is representative for the total global 
pharmaceutical industry. It is worth noting that country-fixed effects are deemed to be 
significant (Hofstede, 1983). This raises the question whether country and/or regional 
differences play a more significant role and need to be further researched, also in view of the 
observed large standard deviation in the Hofstede variables. Furthermore, when considering 
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the nature of our firms, a clear skewness can be found in terms of firm sizes, as the data is not 
normally distributed. Even though this is partly accounted for in the analysis by taking the 
logarithm of the firm size, the firm size distribution may not be representative of the total 
pharmaceutical industry. A more extensive data-set would allow for more clear-cut and 
significant results. However, this was not feasible within the time-bound constraints of this 
thesis.  
Secondly, the nature of all firms in the data set may hinder us from drawing more 
significant conclusions. Even though all firms operate in the pharmaceutical industry (SIC 
Code 2834) there is still a large variety in types of firms as some may be highly specialized 
due to being patent protected for a drug whilst others may thrive by producing bulk medicine. 
Moreover, not all firms are in direct competition as some smaller firms are only operating on 
a nation-wide scale whilst others are acting globally. This results in some firms being in a less 
competitive environment and as a consequence they do not need to continuously innovate 
whilst others may need to in order to survive (Cardinal, 2001; DiMasi et al., 1991; Li & Tang, 
2010).  
Thirdly, a limitation concerns the accuracy of the measurement of CEO 
overconfidence. Using option-based measures to calculate CEO overconfidence may lead to 
clearer results as can be seen in the findings of Malmendier & Tate (2005a). These measures 
were not considered feasible to be used in this thesis as this data is not readily accessible and 
out of reach given the time-frame and scope of this thesis. This limited the measurement of 
CEO overconfidence to solely a linguistic analysis. Although the use of linguistic analysis has 
been used before by scholars (e.g. Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997; Hirshleifer et al., 2012; 
Levy, 2005), this is mainly done on press-based releases, as opposed to the letters to 
shareholders that were used in this thesis to measure CEO overconfidence. The usage of 
documents issued by the firm itself could limit the accuracy of the overconfidence measure as 
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these shareholder letters are likely to be reviewed by multiple individuals (e.g. legal, finance 
etc) and as a result the wording may not fully reflect the level of CEO overconfidence. 
Moreover, the word list used by LIWC has not been designed to accurately analyse 
overconfidence but rather to score rank & power which may only address part of the CEO 
overconfidence attributes (Kacewicz et al., 2013). This may partly explain the significant 
negative between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation performance that had not been 
observed by previous scholars. 
As a fourth limitation, R&D expenditure may not be the most accurate proxy for firm 
innovation performance due to the skewed distribution in firm size within this sample. Even 
though the logarithm was taken, an additional proxy could be added in terms of patent and 
citation count. However, the acquisition of these additional proxy measures was considered not 
realistic for the scope of this thesis.  
After identifying these limitations there are several areas within this thesis that indicate 
opportunities for future research. First of all, future research could be done in the field in of 
comparing various CEO overconfidence measures (option-based, press-based, LTS-based etc) 
and assessing the accuracy of each of these methods. It would be of particular interest to cross 
check the LIWC-method with the option-based method of Malmendier & Tate (2005a). In the 
context of the above comparisons, it is important to realize that overconfidence can take many 
forms such as being overly optimistic, narcissistic or having judgmental overconfidence (Herz, 
Schunk & Zehnder, 2014). The different aspects of overconfidence may well impact the CEO’s 
drive for firm innovation and needs to be considered in defining CEO overconfidence more 
specifically. Besides clarifying CEO overconfidence, future researchers could compare various 
firm innovation measures (patent counts, citation counts, R&D expenditure, number of new 
product introductions etc) and assess their similarities. In the context of the firm innovation 
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comparisons, it is important to delve into the exact type of innovation as radical or incremental 
innovation may bring about different findings (Cardinal, 2001). 
Nohria & Gulati (1997) have been exploring the impact of organisational slack and 
have hypothesized an inverse u-shaped curve in which extremes are both detrimental for 
innovation. This research in combination with the significant direct effect of organisational 
slack on firm innovation performance observed in this thesis calls for more extensive research 
in which this inverse u-shaped character could be modelled. 
Finally, it is recommended to significantly expand the sample size, such that the data 
set can be subdivided into statistically meaningful subsets. These subsets could be defined on 
the basis of geographic location, nature of business (global/local), firm size, product 
range/deliverable etc. This way, many of the identified limitations of the current thesis are 
likely to be addressed. It would be useful to consider using more control variables in terms of 
CEO characteristics such as gender, educational background and nationality as part of the 
future research effort. As a final remark, future research should explore different industries 
which also heavily rely on innovation in order to assess the generalization of the findings for 
the pharmaceutical industry. 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
In recent years, an increasing amount of attention has been devoted to CEO overconfidence 
and its influence (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick & Mason,1984; Hambrick, 2007; 
Mackey, 2008). Even though much research has focussed on the impact of CEO 
overconfidence on firm innovation performance (Galasso & Simcoe, 2010; Hirshleifer et al., 
2012; Malmendier & Tate, 2005a), little research has been dedicated specifically to the impact 
of firm factors on this relationship (Arena et al., 2018). This thesis aims to analyse the effect 
of organisational slack, firm leverage and firm growth on the relationship between CEO 
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overconfidence and firm innovation performance. Through empirical research, this thesis 
established a significant negative relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm 
innovation performance. Furthermore, a positive moderation impact of organisational slack on 
the above-mentioned relationship was found. In other words, more organisational slack allows 
for overconfident CEOs to have a stronger influence on firm innovation performance through 
the available resources. On the other hand, a direct negative impact of organisational slack on 
firm innovation performance was observed. This result can be explained by Nohria & Gulati 
(1997) who argue that a more complex relationship exists between organisational slack and 
innovation, suggesting an optimal amount of organisational slack. Too little organisational 
slack inhibits expenditure on innovation projects, whilst too much may cause inefficient 
innovation projects to be started up that negatively impact form innovation performance. 
 Although not the main objective of the thesis, our findings also show the significant 
impact of CEO-specific factors (age & tenure), firm size and country-fixed effects (Hofstede 
dimensions) on firm innovation performance. In concrete terms, our findings show that older 
CEOs are more innovative whilst CEOs whom have been CEO for a longer time tend to be less 
innovative. Moreover, firm size has a direct positive impact on the firm’s level of innovation. 
In conclusion, firms are recommended to take CEO characteristics into account when 
assessing and selecting CEOs. Importantly, proper organisational slack target setting should be 
conducted as our findings show the dual impact organisational slack has on firm innovation 
performance. Future scholars are suggested to further investigate the possible correlations 
between the different proxies of both CEO overconfidence and firm innovation performance. 
Furthermore, more extensive research on organisational slack following Nohria & Gulati 
(1997) should be considered in order to examine the exact interaction. Finally, additional 
industries should be explored in order to assess the generalizability of the findings within this 
thesis.  
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A - HOFSTEDE SCORES PER COUNTRY 
 
Hofstede Scores 
Country of origin Power Distance Uncertainty Avoidance Individualism 
Belgium 65 94 75 
China 80 30 20 
Denmark 18 23 74 
Finland 33 59 63 
France 68 86 71 
Germany 35 65 67 
Hungary 46 82 80 
India 77 40 48 
Indonesia 78 48 14 
Ireland 28 35 70 
Italy 50 75 76 
Japan 54 92 46 
Netherlands 38 53 80 
Russia 93 95 39 
Singapore 74 8 20 
Slovenia 71 88 27 
South Africa 49 49 65 
Sweden 31 29 71 
Switzerland 34 58 68 
UK 35 35 89 
USA 40 46 91 
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APPENDIX B - LIST OF FIRMS IN DATASET 
 
List of firms in dataset 
Abbott Laboratories Exelixis Inc Perrigo Co 
Addex Therapeutics Gedeon Richter Plc Pfizer Inc 
Alexion Pharma Glaxosmithkline PLC Pharmstandard 
Alk-Abello A/S Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Ltd Piramal Enterprises Ltd 
Altana AG Granules India Ltd Qiagen NV 
AmerisourceBergen H Lundbeck A/S Recordati Spa 
Amgen Inc Haw Par Roche Holdings AG 
Aspen Pharmaceuticals Hikma Pharmaceuticals Plc Santen Pharmaceutical 
Astellas Pharmaceuticals Inc Hisamitsu Pharmaceuticals Sartorius AG 
Astrazeneca Plc Ipsen SA Sawai Pharmaceutical Co Ltd 
Aurobindo Pharmaceutical Ltd Jazz Pharmaceuticals Plc Seikagaku Corporation 
Basilea Pharmaceutica Johnson & Johnson Shionnogi & Co Ltd 
Baxter International Kaken Pharmaceuticals Co Ltd Shire Ltd 
Bayer AG Kalbe Farma Sihuan Pharm HDG GP 
BB Biotech KRKA DD Nova Mesto Sobi Biovitrum 
Biogen Iden Inc Kyorin Co Ltd Stada Arzneimittel AG 
Bristol Myers Squibb Co. Kyowa Hakko Kirin Co Ltd Sumitomo Dainnippon Pharma Co 
BTG PLC Lannett Co Inc Sun Pharm Industries 
Cadila Healthcare Ltd McKesson Suven Life Sciences 
China Shineway Pharmaceuticals  Meda AB Sysmex Corp 
Chugai Pharmaceutical Co Ltd Merck KGAA Taisho Pharmaceutical Holdings 
Cumberland Pharmaceuticals Mitsubishi Tanabe Seiyaku Takeda Pharmaceutical Co 
Daiichi Sannkyo Company Ltd Mitsubishi Tanabe Pharma Tsumura & Co 
Dainippon Sumitomo Pharma Co Nippon Shinyaku Co Ltd UCB Corp 
Dechra Pharmaceuticals Novartis AG Unichem Laboratories Ltd 
Dr Reddys (Laboratories Inc) Novo Nordisk A/S Valeant Pharmaceuticals Intl 
Eisai Co Ltd ONO Pharmaceuticals Co Ltd Valneva 
Eli Lilly & Co Orion Corporation  
Evotec AG Otsuka Holdings Co Ltd  
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APPENDIX C - VARIABLES 
 
Name Measurement 
Dependent Variable 
Overconfidence Measure 
Clout Score measured by content analysis using LIWC 2015 in which previous 
findings by Kacewicz et al. (2012) resulting in clout scores whom predicts the 
relative rank and power of an individual. 
Independent Variables 
Innovation Performance R&D Expenditure, measured as follows: 1(2(4&6	789-':#+;$-	$=) 
Organisational Slack 
Current Ratio, measured as follows: ?;$$-'+	d]]-+]?;$$-'+	1#*M#\#+#-] 
Firm Leverage 
Debt to Equity Ratio, measured as follows: b(+*\	\#*M#\#+#-][ℎ*$-ℎ(\:-$	7N;#+O 
Firm Growth Log Net Sales, measured as follows: 1(2([*\-]_$E) − 1(2([*\-]$E_`) 
Control Variables 
CEO Age Current year minus year of birth 
CEO Tenure Current year minus year at which he became CEO of the firm 
Firm Size Log Employees measured by collecting the number of employees (in thousands) and taking the logarithmic function 
Dummy_2011 Dummy variables that have a value 1 for 2011 and 0 for any other year. 
Dummy_2012 Dummy variables that have a value 1 for 2012 and 0 for any other year. 
Dummy_2013 Dummy variables that have a value 1 for 2013 and 0 for any other year. 
Dummy_2014 Dummy variables that have a value 1 for 2014 and 0 for any other year. 
Dummy_2015 Dummy variables that have a value 1 for 2015 and 0 for any other year. 
Power Distance Power distance score obtained by Hofstede’s country dimensions (obtained per 2018) 
Uncertainty Avoidance Uncertainty avoidance score obtained by Hofstede’s country dimensions (obtained per 2018) 
Individualism Individualism score obtained by Hofstede’s country dimensions (obtained per 2018) 
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APPENDIX D - REGRESSION MODELS 
 
Hypotheses Regression Model 
Controls 
4&6	789-':#+;$-	$	 = 	e	 +	g`	?7h	d2- +	gi	?7h	b-';$- +	gj	1(2	-%9\(O--] +	gk	,(X-$	6#]+*'/-	 +	gl	m'/-$+*#'#+O	d)(#:*'/- +	gn	&':#)#:;*\#]%	 +	go	p-*$	6;%%#-] + q  
 
Hypothesis 1 
4&6	789-':#+;$-	$	 = 	e	 +	g`	?7h	d2- +	gi	?7h	b-';$- +	gj	1(2	-%9\(O--] +	gk	,(X-$	6#]+*'/-	 +	gl	m'/-$+*#'#+O	d)(#:*'/- +	gn	&':#)#:;*\#]%	 +	go	p-*$	6;%%#-] + gr	?\(;+	s*$#*M\- + q  
 
Hypothesis 2 
4&6	789-':#+;$-	$	 = 	e	 +	g`	?7h	d2- +	gi	?7h	b-';$- +	gj	1(2	-%9\(O--] +	gk	,(X-$	6#]+*'/-	 +	gl	m'/-$+*#'#+O	d)(#:*'/- +	gn	&':#)#:;*\#]%	 +	go	p-*$	6;%%#-] + gr	?\(;+	s*$#*M\- + gt	?\(;+ ∗?;$$-'+	4*+#( + q  
 
Hypothesis 3 
4&6	789-':#+;$-	$	 = 	e	 +	g`	?7h	d2- +	gi	?7h	b-';$- +	gj	1(2	-%9\(O--] +	gk	,(X-$	6#]+*'/-	 +	gl	m'/-$+*#'#+O	d)(#:*'/- +	gn	&':#)#:;*\#]%	 +	go	p-*$	6;%%#-] + gr	?\(;+	s*$#*M\- + gt	?\(;+ ∗6-M+	+(	7N;#+O	$*+#( + q  
 
Hypothesis 4 
4&6	789-':#+;$-	$	 = 	e	 +	g`	?7h	d2- +	gi	?7h	b-';$- +	gj	1(2	-%9\(O--] +	gk	,(X-$	6#]+*'/-	 +	gl	m'/-$+*#'#+O	d)(#:*'/- +	gn	&':#)#:;*\#]%	 +	go	p-*$	6;%%#-] + gr	?\(;+	s*$#*M\- + gt	?\(;+ ∗6-\+*	1(2	v-+	[*\-] + q  
 
 
APPENDIX E - ONE SAMPLE T-TEST 
 
 
One-Sample Test Clout Score against baseline Clout score  
(M = 57.95, SD = 17.51)  
Test Value = 57.95 
     95% CI 
 t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Clout Score 64.947 478 .000 26.52885 25.7262 27.3315 
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APPENDIX F - ASSUMPTIONS 
 
Heteroscedasticity & Q-Q Plots 
  
Cooks distance graphically 
  
Residual Statistics 
 Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
Predicted Value -.0607 3.8019 2.3290 .7908 
Std. Predicted Value -3.022 1.863 .000 1.000 
Standard Error of Predicted Value .055 .111 .070 .011 
Adjusted Predicted Value -.1262 3.8039 2.3286 .7920 
Residual -1.0807 1.1826 .0000 .4254 
Std. Residual -2.508 2.745 .000 .987 
Stud. Residual -2.572 2.791 .000 1.003 
Deleted Residual -1.1360 1.2226 .0004 .4386 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.587 2.811 .000 1.005 
Mahal. Distance 6.919 30.665 11.975 4.178 
Cook's Distance .000 .031 .002 .004 
Centered Leverage Value .014 .064 .025 .009 
N = 479; Dependent variable: Log R&D Expenditure 
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APPENDIX G - HAYES PROCESS OUTPUT 
 
************* PROCESS Procedure for SPSS Release 2.16.3 ****************** 
 
          Written by Andrew F. Hayes, Ph.D.       www.afhayes.com 
    Documentation available in Hayes (2013). www.guilford.com/p/hayes3 
 
************************************************************************** 
Model = 1 
    Y = Log RnD Expenditure 
    X = Clout Score 
    M = Current Ratio 
 
Statistical Controls: 
CONTROL= Log_Empl Age      Tenure   FirmP.D FirmU.A FirmIND Dummy_20 
Dummy__1 Dummy__2 Dummy__3 Dummy__4 
 
Sample size 
        479 
 
************************************************************************** 
Outcome: Log RnD Expenditure 
 
Model Summary 
R       R-sq        MSE          F        df1        df2          p 
.8822      .7783      .1841   116.3773    14.0000   464.0000      .0000 
 
Model 
              coeff         se          t          p       LLCI       ULCI 
constant     -.9026      .3273    -2.7578      .0060    -1.5457     -.2594 
Current_     -.0715      .0342    -2.0923      .0370     -.1387     -.0044 
Clout_Sc     -.0095      .0029    -3.2345      .0013     -.0153     -.0037 
int_1         .0012      .0005     2.2370      .0258      .0001      .0022 
Log_Empl      .8832      .0292    30.2461      .0000      .8259      .9406 
Age           .0110      .0034     3.2295      .0013      .0043      .0176 
Tenure       -.0215      .0027    -7.9760      .0000     -.0268     -.0162 
FirmP.D      -.0133      .0019    -7.0857      .0000     -.0170     -.0096 
FirmU.A       .0079      .0010     7.9939      .0000      .0059      .0098 
FirmIND       .0063      .0015     4.0843      .0001      .0032      .0093 
Dummy_20     -.0132      .0681     -.1942      .8461     -.1470      .1206 
Dummy__1     -.0045      .0682     -.0657      .9477     -.1385      .1295 
Dummy__2     -.0044      .0680     -.0649      .9483     -.1380      .1292 
Dummy__3      .0036      .0678      .0529      .9578     -.1297      .1368 
Dummy__4     -.0318      .0671     -.4734      .6362     -.1636      .1001 
 
Product terms key: 
 
 int_1    Clout_Sc    X     Current_ 
 
R-square increase due to interaction(s): 
         R2-chng          F        df1        df2          p 
int_1      .0024     5.0040     1.0000   464.0000      .0258 
 
************************************************************************* 
 
Conditional effect of X on Y at values of the moderator(s): 
Current  Effect        se          t          p          LLCI       ULCI 
.4328      -.0090      .0028     -3.1814     .0016     -.0146     -.0034 
3.0439      -.0059      .0025     -2.3416     .0196     -.0108     -.0009 
7.5701     -.0005      .0035      -.1393      .8892     -.0075      .0065 
 

